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The Communications Decency Act (CDA) provides Internet 
platforms complete liability protection from user-generated 
content. This Article discusses the costs of this current legal 
framework and several potential solutions. It proposes three 
modifications to the CDA that would use a carrot and stick to 
incentivize companies to take a more active role in addressing 
some of the most blatant downsides of user-generated content on 
the Internet. Despite the modest nature of these proposed changes, 
they would have a significant impact. 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 31, 2017, a truck allegedly driven by Sayfullo 
Habibullaevic Saipov sped onto a bike path in New York City. The truck 
struck multiple people, killing eight of them. Saipov then allegedly 
emerged from the truck and brandished a paintball and pellet gun before 
being shot by a police officer.1 Although investigators are still trying to 
determine the details of Saipov’s path to radicalization, there is evidence 
he was radicalized by exposure to online materials created by the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).2  
For years, experts have sounded warnings about how terrorists use 
social media and online resources to recruit, train, plan, finance, and 
coordinate their activities.3 ISIS has been especially adept at using social 
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1 See Holly Yan & Dakin Andone, Who is New York Terror Suspect Sayfullo 
Saipov?, CNN (Nov. 2, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/01/us/sayfullo-
saipov-new-york-attack/index.html.  
2 See Nicole Chavez et al., New York Attack Suspect Charged with Federal 
Terrorism Offenses, CNN (Nov. 2, 2017),  https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/01/ 
us/new-york-attack/index.html.  
3 See, e.g., Maeghin Alarid, Recruitment and Radicalization: The Role of Social 
Media and New Technology, in IMPUNITY, 313 (Michelle Hughes & Michael 
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media to spread its message of hate.4 Indeed, on a single day in 2014, ISIS 
posted nearly 40,000 Tweets.5 
The continued use of the Internet and social media by terrorists 
and hate groups to facilitate their activities has fueled a growing debate 
about whether the U.S. government should take a more aggressive role in 
combating online hate speech. Some have argued that the government 
should take a direct role in regulating online content either by classifying 
social media websites as public forums or reclassifying the Internet as a 
public utility.6 This Article will examine these options and argue that they 
would actually make regulating online hate speech more difficult.  
Consequently, the better approach to regulating online hate speech 
is to amend the Communications Decency Act (CDA). This Article 
proposes three specific changes that utilize both a carrot and sticks. The 
sticks would remove the current absolute liability protection for social 
media platforms for content posted by designated foreign terrorist 
organizations and individuals who claim membership in those 
organizations. The carrot, however, would provide a safe harbor from 
liability protection for companies that institute compliance programs and 
make reasonable efforts to remove such content. 
Part I of this Article will examine the First Amendment and the 
CDA. It will discuss how the marketplace of ideas underpins the First 
Amendment. This underpinning helps to explain and justify the Supreme 
Court’s incitement jurisprudence. This First Amendment jurisprudence, 
combined with the CDA’s liability protection, has created an Internet 
where the government has almost no ability to limit hateful online content. 
However, companies have huge discretion to determine what content to 
allow on their own sites. Part II will discuss several options for the 
government to take a more direct, regulatory role online. It will show how 
                                                 
Miklaucic eds., 2016), http://cco.ndu.edu/Publications/Books/Impunity 
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Director, National Security Branch).  
5 How Terrorists are Using Social Media, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 4, 2014, 4:02 
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6 See infra Part II. 
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direct government control of the Internet would actually impede 
government efforts to combat problematic online speech. Part III will 
discuss modifying the CDA to help diminish terrorist hate speech online. 
It will put forth several amendments to the CDA and then discuss and 
address several possible concerns to the proposal. These proposed 
modifications to the CDA would have a significant impact and little 
downside. 
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT, THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT, 
AND THE REALITY ONLINE 
The U.S. provides very high protections for speech, both online 
and offline.7 Free speech jurisprudence is grounded in the First 
Amendment, which provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”8 Despite its inclusion in the Bill of 
Rights, the First Amendment generated little litigation until World War I.9  
Current First Amendment jurisprudence is grounded in the 
“marketplace of ideas” rationale. This rationale informs the court’s 
jurisprudence on incitement and makes it very difficult for (1) speech to 
qualify as incitement and (2) the government to censor any content, 
including online content. The CDA provides additional protections for 
platform providers by absolving them of liability for user-generated 
content. Taken together, these three characteristics have created an 
environment where it is nearly impossible for the U.S. government to 
censor even terrorists’ online speech. Conversely, private companies that 
control Internet platforms have a nearly unlimited ability to restrict content 
on their sites, although they have little incentive to do so.  
A. The Marketplace of Ideas 
The marketplace of ideas rationale can be traced back to Justice 
Holmes’ famous dissent in Abrams v. United States.10 Justice Holmes 
stated that the theory behind the U.S. Constitution is “that the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition 
                                                 
7 See Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 
651, 688 (2017) (noting that the U.S. “approach to free speech tends to be more 
libertarian than Europe’s and Canada’s”). 
8 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
9 See Alan K Chen, Free Speech and the Confluence of National Security and 
Internet Exceptionalism, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 379, 381 (2017) (noting that 
“[t]he modern understanding of the free speech doctrine is only about 100 years 
old.”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as 
Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 665, 725 (1992) (stating that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
on the First Amendment was a “late bloomer”). 
10 250 U.S. 616, 624–30 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting).   
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of the market.”11 A few years later in a concurrence, Justice Brandeis 
posited that “[t]hose who won our independence believed that the final end 
of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties” and “that 
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means 
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.”12  
Since then, the marketplace of ideas rationale has gained 
widespread acceptance on the Court.13 Following Abrams, the Court has 
repeatedly affirmed the concept as the rationale underlying the First 
Amendment.14 It noted that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying 
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive 
or disagreeable.”15 The marketplace of ideas rationale has been influential 
in the Court’s Internet-related jurisprudence. For example, the Court held 
that portions of the CDA, as originally drafted, violated the First 
Amendment by chilling speech and impairing the marketplace of ideas.16 
B. Incitement  
The Court’s current interpretation of incitement is also relatively 
recent. Its early incitement jurisprudence was heavily influenced by the 
current events of the day, namely World War I.17 In these early cases, the 
                                                 
11 Id. at 630. 
12 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).  
13 See Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 
821, 825 (2008) (noting that “First Amendment doctrine has carried Holmes's 
laissez-faire marketplace banner more or less faithfully since Abrams . . .”). 
14 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (noting that “The constitutional 
right of free expression is . . . . designed and intended to remove governmental 
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what 
views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of 
such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect 
polity . . .” (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–77 (1927)); N.Y. 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. 476, 484) (stating that the constitutional safeguard of freedom of 
expression “was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”).  
15 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (holding that flag burning was 
protected under the First Amendment). 
16 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997). 
17 See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (citing Aikens v. 
Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904)) (noting that while “in ordinary times” the 
defendant’s advocacy against the draft would be constitutionally protected, “the 
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.”); 
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919) (stating that “the 
circulation of the paper [which criticized the war effort] was in quarters where a 
little breath would be enough to kindle a flame . . . .”). 
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Court did not require the government show actual or even imminent harm. 
Rather, a successful conviction could be based on showing that the 
defendant’s actions “had as their natural tendency and reasonably probable 
effect” lawless action.18 
However, in its landmark decision Brandenburg v. Ohio, the 
Court shifted course, adopting a three-part test to determine if speech 
qualified as unprotected incitement, requiring the speech be (1) directed 
toward inciting or producing (2) imminent lawless actions and (3) likely 
to incite or produce such actions.19 Since Brandenburg, the Court has 
clarified that imminent lawless actions must be more than “advocacy of 
illegal action at some indefinite future time”20 and sooner than “weeks or 
months” after the speech.21 
The Brandenburg test is very difficult for the government to pass. 
For example, in one case a boycott organizer threatened to have those who 
violated the boycott “disciplined,” saying that “[i]f we catch any of you 
going in any of them racist stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck.”22 
Though boycott violators were publicly identified, called traitors,23 and 
allegedly subjected to violence or threats,24 the Court held that the 
defendant’s actions were constitutionally protected under the First 
Amendment.25 Moreover, “[t]he mere tendency of speech to encourage 
unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it . . . .”26 Therefore, 
the Brandenburg conditions are very difficult to meet. 
                                                 
18 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919). See also Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925) (reasoning that even though the defendants’ 
alleged criminal anarchy conviction for publishing a manifesto urging a 
communist revolution by mass industrial revolts did not cause “immediate 
danger,” the conviction was proper because “[a] single revolutionary spark may 
kindle a fire that, smouldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and 
destructive conflagration.”). 
19 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curium). 
20 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (holding that defendant’s statement 
during an anti-war protest of “We’ll take the fucking street later (or again)” 
while standing close to law enforcement officials was not incitement to 
imminent illegal action). 
21 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982).  
22 Id. at 902. 
23 Id. at 903–04. 
24 Id. at 904–06. 
25 Id. at 928 (stating that “[s]trong and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot 
be nicely channeled in purely dulcet phrases. An advocate must be free to 
stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals . . . . When such 
appeals do not incite lawless action, they must be regarded as protected 
speech.”). 
26 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002). 
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C. The Communications Decency Act 
The CDA serves as another significant bar to limiting online 
speech. It provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”27 It defines 
“information content provider” as “any person or entity that is responsible, 
in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information 
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”28 
Website operators, such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, can 
simultaneously be both operators and content providers.29  
The CDA also specifically notes under its findings that it was 
inspired by the marketplace of ideas rationale.30 The CDA provides a 
significant additional protection to online speech that supplements the 
already very strong protections provided by the First Amendment and the 
Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence. 
D. Online Hate Speech  
Online speech is defined by two main attributes. First, the 
government has little independent ability to regulate or censor even the 
most egregious online content. Second, companies hosting such content 
have a nearly unlimited ability to censor, or not censor, whatever content 
they want to on their platforms. Not surprisingly, these conditions have led 
to a world in which victims of hate speech or terrorism that is facilitated 
by online content have little recourse. 
Despite the CDA’s protections, lawsuits have sought to hold 
social media websites responsible for some content posted by users. In 
particular, several cases have attempted to hold social media companies 
liable for deaths in terrorist attacks under the Anti-Terrorism Act. In these 
cases, the plaintiffs have alleged that social media companies provided 
material support to terrorists who then carried out attacks, including an 
attack on government contractors in Jordan31 and terrorist attacks in 
Europe.32 For example, one pending complaint alleges that even though 
Twitter knew that ISIS was a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, 
                                                 
27 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). 
28 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). 
29 See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
30 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (stating that “[t]he Internet and other interactive 
computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse . . .”). 
31 Fields v. Twitter, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d No. 16-
17165 2018 WL 626800 (9th Cir 2018). 
32 Cain v. Twitter, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62724, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 
2017). 
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“Twitter has for years knowingly provided its Services to ISIS, its 
members, organizations owned or controlled by ISIS, and organizations 
and individuals that provide financing and material support to ISIS.”33 
Moreover, the complaint alleges that Twitter helped ISIS conduct past 
terrorist attacks by aiding ISIS’ internal and external communications, 
planning, recruiting, organizing, training, and funding.34 While the court 
has not yet ruled on the merits of the that case, another federal district court 
dismissed a comparable set of claims, holding that the CDA shielded 
Twitter from liability since it was not an information content provider.35 
Additionally, in Klayman v. Zuckerburg the D.C. Circuit 
dismissed a similar claim against Facebook.36 In this case, the plaintiff 
alleged intentional assault and negligent breach of duty of care for 
Facebook’s failure to promptly remove a page entitled the “Third 
Palestinian Intifada.”37 With more than 360,000 members, the page called 
for an uprising against the Israeli occupation of Palestinian areas, and 
proclaimed that “Judgment Day” would only arrive when “Muslims have 
killed all the Jews.”38 Klayman alleged both he and the Israeli government 
had warned Facebook about the page, but Facebook had failed to promptly 
remove it. In affirming the district court’s dismissal, the D.C. Circuit held 
that the CDA barred Facebook’s liability since Facebook was not the 
information content provider.39  
Despite such pressure, efforts to make significant amendments to 
the CDA have not yet been successful. Congress recently passed a narrow 
amendment to the CDA that removes the CDA’s liability protections for 
sex-trafficking.40 However, the bill is very narrowly tailored and does not 
apply to online hate or terrorist speech.41  
Consequently, the U.S. government has engaged in almost no 
regulation of online hate speech or incitement on non-government 
websites. Conversely, most Internet companies have broad power to police 
                                                 
33 Complaint at 382–83, Cain v. Twitter, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62724 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2017). 
34 Id. at 209–12. 
35 Fields, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. The court in Cain v. Twitter has not yet 
decided the case on the merits; it has merely allowed the case to be transferred 
from Southern District of New York to the Northern District of California. Cain 
v. Twitter, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62724, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2017). 
36 Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359–60 (2014). 
37 Id. at 1356. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 1357–60. 
40 See Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, 
P.L. 115-164, § 4(a), 132 Stat. 1253, 1254 (2018). 
41 See id. 
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what information, including user-generated information, is on their 
websites. Most websites and web services have user agreements that allow 
platforms to determine the type of content they allow on their websites.42 
Thus, private companies have full discretion regarding whether to censor 
virtually any content their users post.  
Companies’ ability to choose whether or not to censor has been 
especially apparent in the wake of a white nationalist rally in 
Charlottesville. Even before the Charlottesville rally and its accompanying 
violence, Airbnb kicked users off its platform that it thought were 
attending the rally.43 Following the violence in Charlottesville, the web-
performance and security company Cloudflare stopped providing services 
to the Daily Stormer, a prominent neo-Nazi and white supremacist news 
and commentary website, effectively taking it offline. In a statement to his 
staff, the CEO wrote “[l]iterally, I woke up in a bad mood and decided 
someone shouldn’t be allowed on the Internet.”44 Additionally, Twitter 
and Facebook removed accounts related to white supremacists,45 PayPal 
                                                 
42 See, e.g., Terms of Service, TWITTER (Oct. 2, 2017), 
https://twitter.com/en/tos#usUsing (noting that “[w]e reserve the right to remove 
Content alleged to be infringing without prior notice, at our sole discretion, and 
without liability to you”); Terms of Service, FACEBOOK (Jan. 30, 2015), 
https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (“[w]e can remove any content or 
information you post on Facebook if we believe that it violates this Statement or 
our policies.”). 
43 Kyle Swenson, Airbnb Boots White Nationalists Headed to ‘Unite the Right’ 




44 Kate Conger, Cloudflare CEO on Terminating Service to Neo-Nazi Site: ‘The 
Daily Stormer are Assholes,’ GIZMODO (Aug. 16, 2017, 6:00 PM), 
https://gizmodo.com/cloudflare-ceo-on-terminating-service-to-neo-nazi-site-
1797915295; see also Matthew Prince, Why We Terminated Daily Stormer, 
CLOUDFLARE (Aug. 16, 2017) https://blog.cloudflare.com/why-we-terminated-
daily-stormer/ (discussing why Cloudflare removed the Daily Stormer). 
45 See Rob Price, Charlottesville is a Tipping Point in Silicon Valley’s Approach 
to Speech, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 17, 2017, 9:16 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/tech-companies-crack-down-hate-speech-
charlottesville-2017-8; see also Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Aug. 16, 2017), 
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10103969849282011 (Facebook founder 
Mark Zuckerberg posted on his Facebook page a message condemning the 
violence and stating that “we’ve always taken down any post that promotes or 
celebrates hate crimes or acts of terrorism -- including what happened in 
Charlottesville.”).  
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blocked white supremacists from using its services,46 and a dating app 
even banned the account of a prominent white supremacist.47 
So, while the CDA prevents individuals from holding private 
companies liable for third party content on their sites, the companies 
themselves have almost unlimited discretion about whether to censor user-
generated content on their sites. This is concerning for several reasons. 
First, although private companies have the ability to take down 
problematic content, they often act after-the-fact and in a very limited 
manner. This is no surprise: searching for content costs money and 
removes users from the platform, both of which harm profits. 
Consequently, platform providers have little incentive to tightly police 
user-generated content on their sites. Moreover, there are often some 
platforms that either sympathize with problematic speech or ignore the 
negative consequences of the speech in a quest to serve a niche market.48 
Additionally, allowing platforms, especially the largest platforms that are 
increasingly central to many people’s lives, to have sole discretion over 
what content is allowed and what is prohibited is anti-democratic.49 The 
more important and central to modern life such sites become, the more 
worrying it becomes for large platforms to lack democratic accountability. 
II. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE AND THE DOWNSIDES OF DIRECT 
GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
This situation has led to calls for greater direct government 
involvement and regulation of the Internet. While there are several ways 
the government could more directly regulate online content, the Public 
Forum Doctrine actually makes such direct government control and 
regulation a poor way to reduce online hate speech.  
A. Direct Government Regulation? 
There are several possibilities for direct government regulation of 
online platforms. One possibility is for the government to classify some 
                                                 
46 Matt Stevens, After Charlottesville, Even Dating Apps are Cracking Down on 
Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2017, at B3. 
47 Id. 
48 For example, the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of 2017 was largely 
motivated by the actions of Backpage.com, a website that allegedly “create[s] a 
marketplace for the sale and purchase of trafficking victims . . . .” See SENATOR 
ROBERT PORTMAN, STOP ENABLING SEX TRAFFICKERS ACT OF 2017 1 (2017), 
available at https://www.portman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/ 
files/serve?File_id=B3F5988E-C4BD-4ACE-A881-6EB9068325B9. 
49 John Herrman, How Hate Groups Forced Online Platforms to Reveal Their 
True Nature, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2017, at MM18 (noting that “[d]espite their 
participatory rhetoric, social platforms are closer to authoritarian spaces than 
democratic ones.”). 
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websites as public forum. In his opinion in Packingham v. North Carolina, 
Justice Kennedy suggested that the Internet, and social media in particular, 
may be becoming “essential venues for public gatherings . . . .”50 Kennedy 
went so far as to call social media “the modern public square” because it 
allows individuals to amplify their speech, including political speech.51 
Justice Kennedy did not discuss the potential impact of classifying some 
websites as public forums on online hate speech or incitement. 
A second possibility is to classify certain websites or web services 
that are increasingly essential to many people’s lives, such as Facebook 
and Google, as public utilities. This idea has been floated by those on both 
ends of the political spectrum52 as well as discussed by some in the 
technology community.53 The idea is simply that the Internet is essential 
to modern life, much like electricity. If classified as a public utility, the 
government could theoretically more easily regulate the largest Internet 
companies.  
B. Public Forum Doctrine and Direct Government Regulation   
The Supreme Court uses a forum-based approach to analyze the 
level of scrutiny and restrictions the government may place on speech in 
government-controlled areas.54 Traditional and designated public forums 
are locations either historically used as or designated by the government 
as places for public assembly, communications, or other expressive 
activity.55 They include, but are not limited to, parks and sidewalks.56  
Limited public forums are created for a specific purpose by the 
government.57 In a limited public forum, the government “must respect the 
lawful boundaries it has itself set” and cannot prohibit activities related to 
the purpose of the forum.58 Some locations are also designated as 
                                                 
50 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). 
51 Id. at 1737 (noting that social media websites “allow a person with an Internet 
connection to ‘become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it 
could from any soapbox’” (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)). 
52 See Robinson Meyer, What Steve Bannon Wants to Do to Google, THE 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 
2017/08/steve-bannon-google-facebook/535473/.  
53 See Danah Boyd, Facebook is a Utility, Utilities Get Regulated, APOPHENIA 
(May 15, 2010), http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2010/05/15/ 
facebook-is-a-utility-utilities-get-regulated.html. 
54 Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992). 
55 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) 
(quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
56 Id. 
57 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 
(1995) (noting that a limited public forum is created for a specific purpose). 
58 Id. 
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nonpublic forums. In such locations, the government may limit speech and 
activities to those “compatible with the intended purpose of the 
property.”59 Finally, other areas, such as government funding programs, 
are classified as not forums at all. When there is no forum, the government 
may advocate for whatever policy it pleases.60 
If subject to direct government control, the Internet would clearly 
be a forum; for the Internet to be a non-public forum, most non-
governmental content would have to be removed from the Internet, a 
scenario almost impossible to imagine.61 Additionally, a limited public 
forum designation would probably too narrowly encapsulate the range of 
legal activity that is allowed online: limited public forums are generally 
created by the government for specific purposes and allow only selective 
access.62  
Consequently, the Internet would likely be classified as a public 
forum. Classifying certain websites like social media platforms as public 
forum, as Justice Kennedy suggests in Packingham, would make 
government regulation of hate speech much more difficult. As Justice 
Alito pointed out in his concurrence in Packingham, classifying social 
media as public forum is “bound to be interpreted by some” as preventing 
governmental regulation of social media that would otherwise be 
permissible.63 The government is very limited in the ways it can restrict 
speech in public forums since there is an especially strong interest in 
protecting speech in those spaces.64 Government regulation of speech in a 
public forum is subject to strict scrutiny,65 which means that the regulation 
must serve a compelling government interest and be narrowly drawn.66 
The  strict scrutiny analysis under the First Amendment has traditionally 
                                                 
59 Perry, 460 U.S. at 49. 
60 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (“The Government can . . . 
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the 
public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which 
seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing, the Government has 
not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one 
activity to the exclusion of the other.”). 
61 See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998); 
Perry, 460 U.S. at 47 (noting that non-public forums generally consist of largely 
government activity or activity very closely related to government action). 
62 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 804–06 
(1985). 
63 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017) (Alito, J. 
concurring). 
64 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014). 
65 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
66 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. 
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been very difficult to pass.67 Therefore, if the Internet were classified as a 
public forum, any government restrictions would face a very high bar.   
III. MODIFYING THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
A. Proposal 
Since courts have interpreted the CDA as giving online platforms, 
including social media companies, blanket liability protection, there is 
currently little incentive for companies to remove content. In response to 
specific and high-profile instances, like the violence in Charlottesville, 
platforms may clamp down on some particularly egregious speech or 
users. Otherwise, platforms lack strong incentivizes to act—any actions 
they take would reduce subscribers and hurt their bottom line. This has 
created an Internet where hate speech is too often left unchecked. To best 
address this problem, this Article suggests three amendments to the CDA. 
Taken together, these changes would lessen terrorist speech online while 
having a negligible impact on other speech. Compliance with these 
proposals would also not unduly burden Internet platforms.  
 First, platforms that fail to promptly take down the official 
accounts of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) operating 
on their websites should lose all liability protections under the CDA. 
Platforms could have a duty to remove such content under two 
circumstances. First, law enforcement could notify the platform of the 
FTO account.68 While notification is an excellent first step, waiting for 
notification does not incentivize platforms to actively seek out FTO 
accounts. Moreover, companies are often in the best position to mine their 
own data, and they have demonstrated a sophisticated ability to identify 
traits about customers.69 Consequently, platforms should also have a duty 
to make reasonable efforts to monitor their platforms for FTO accounts.  
There is no reasonable justification for allowing FTOs to amplify 
their messages of hate on online platforms. If a platform knows the FTO 
is using its service and fails to stop the FTO, the platform may already be 
                                                 
67 See David Cole, The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL'Y 
REV. 147, 148 (2012).  
68 See Michelle Roter, Note, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility: 
Imposing a “Duty to Take Down” Terrorist Incitement on Social Media, 45 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1404–08 (2017) (proposing that social media 
companies have a duty to take down terrorist accounts only after law 
enforcement notification). 
69 See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, at 
MM30 (discussing Target’s use of data mining to determine a customer was 
pregnant before her family knew about the pregnancy).  
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violating the terrorist material support statute.70 It makes little sense, then, 
for platforms to have civil liability protection when they potentially have 
criminal liability. Removing the CDA’s civil liability shield is likely to 
provide a greater incentive for companies to modify their behavior than 
criminal penalties because private parties are often more likely to sue than 
the government.  
 Additionally, designation as an FTO reflects the political 
branches’ determination that the group is a foreign terrorist organization 
and harmful to U.S. interests. Although law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies may gain some intelligence from terrorist accounts and 
websites,71 there is little reason to think that this change to the CDA would 
significantly impair intelligence gathering. Many other means of gathering 
intelligence would remain, including examining the statements such 
organizations make to the news media, signals intelligence, or other 
traditional intelligence means. What such a prohibition would do is make 
it harder for FTOs to spread their messages, solicit donations, and recruit 
new adherents.  
Consequently, to make it much more difficult for FTOs to spread 
their messages, Congress should amend the CDA to add the following 
language, or language to a similar effect:  
§ 230(c)(3): An interactive computer service provider may be treated 
as the publisher or speaker of such content if the provider knows or 
should have known the content was provided by a designated foreign 
terrorist organization under 8 U.S.C. § 1189. 
Second, the CDA should no longer provide liability protection for 
companies that fail to remove user-generated content of individuals who 
explicitly self-identify as members of an FTO. Similar to identifying FTO 
accounts, platforms should likely have little trouble finding such content 
since this exception to the CDA’s blanket protection would only apply to 
individuals who explicitly self-identified as members of FTOs. Moreover, 
this provision would be narrowly tailored to only apply to individuals that 
meet the demanding standards of “personnel” under 18 U.S.C. 2339B(h).72 
                                                 
70 See id. 
71 See Benjamin Wittes & Zoe Bedell, Tweeting Terrorists, Part III: How Would 
Twitter Defend Itself Against a Material Support Prosecution, LAWFARE (Feb. 
14, 2016, 7:16 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/tweeting-terrorists-part-iii-
how-would-twitter-defend-itself-against-material-support-prosecution (noting 
that there may be security benefits in “being able to follow what terrorist groups 
are thinking and trying to communicate to their followers[.]”) . 
72 The statute provides that: 
No person may be prosecuted under this section in connection with the 
term ‘personnel’ unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted 
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Removing blanket liability protection for user-generated content 
authored by explicitly self-identified members of FTOs would incentivize 
companies to proactively remove the most problematic user-generated 
content on their platforms. Consequently, the CDA should be modified so 
that it includes the following language:  
§ 230(c)(4): U.S.C. § 230(c) shall not be interpreted as providing 
interactive computer service providers immunity from private civil 
suits for information content authored by publishers or speakers who  
(A) publicly identify themselves as members of an organization 
that has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization under 
8 U.S.C. § 1189,  
(B)  qualify as “personnel” under 18 U.S.C. 2339B(h), and 
(C) the information service provider failed to promptly remove 
such content. 
 Finally, as long as platforms make reasonable, good faith efforts, 
they should continue to enjoy liability protection for user-generated 
content.73 One way to determine if platforms are taking reasonable steps 
would be to create a certification program. Such a program could be self-
certified and similar to the U.S.-E.U. Privacy Shield74 or the Department 
of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology Critical 
Infrastructure for Cybersecurity Framework.75 Since technology changes 
so quickly, the requirement should be broad. To create such a safe harbor, 
the CDA could include the following language:  
                                                 
to provide, or conspired to provide a foreign terrorist organization with 
1 or more individuals (who may be or include himself) to work under 
that terrorist organization's direction or control or to organize, manage, 
supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization. 
Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist 
organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered 
to be working under the foreign terrorist organization's direction and 
control.  
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) (2015). 
73 See Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: 
Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 419 (2017) 
(proposing a modification to the CDA that requires companies to make 
reasonable efforts to remove unlawful user-generated content on their platforms 
to receive liability protection). 
74 See Welcome to the Privacy Shield, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/welcome (last visited Dec. 9, 2017). 
75 See Cybersecurity Framework, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., 
https://www.nist.gov/cybersecurity-framework (last visited Dec. 10, 2017). 
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§ 230(c)(5): Any provider of an interactive computer service that has 
made good faith efforts to comply with 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(3) and (4) 
shall not be deemed to be a publisher or speaker. Such reasonable 
efforts may include a self-certification scheme that satisfies 
requirements approved by the Department of Commerce.  
B. Discussion 
 Together, these three amendments would have a significant 
impact without raising many of the complications of some other suggested 
modifications to the CDA. First, the lack of direct government regulation 
would avoid the stringent forum analysis required by reclassifying the 
Internet as a public forum or utility.  
In contrast to some other proposals,76 these measures would also 
be unlikely to raise other First Amendment challenges. Even assuming 
these proposals would be classified as restrictions on speech and not 
conduct,77 they would still almost certainly be constitutional under 
Humanitarian Law Project (HLP). In HLP, the Court held that it was 
permissible for the government to bar organizations from engaging in 
activities such as training FTOs in “how to use humanitarian and 
international law to peacefully resolve disputes.”78 The Court emphasized 
the strong government “interest in combating terrorism” could outweigh 
burdens on speech.79 These proposals here clearly address a very strong 
interest in the government preventing terrorists from using platforms to 
organize, recruit, train, and fundraise. Moreover, they would merely 
remove protections for platforms that knew or should have known about 
activity much more directly related to foreign terrorism than the activities 
the Court found the government could restrict in HLP. In HLP, the Court 
also showed great deference to the political branches’ determination of 
                                                 
76 See Eric Posner, ISIS Gives Us No Choice But to Consider Limits on Speech, 
SLATE (Dec. 15, 2015, 5:37 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/12/isis_s_online_radicalization_eff
orts_present_an_unprecedented_danger.html (proposing a law that that the 
author acknowledges would likely be unconstitutional under current doctrine 
that would make it a crime to access or share links of “websites that glorify, 
express support for, or provide encouragement for ISIS or support recruitment 
by ISIS”); Citron & Wittes, supra note 73, at 411 (noting that “[u]nless the 
[Supreme] Court upends the table, it is hard to imagine a retreat from the broad-
sweeping interpretation of § 230 adopted in the state and lower federal courts.”). 
77 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26–28 (2010) 
(discussing when to apply the more stringent First Amendment speech analysis 
and when to apply the less stringent conduct analysis).  
78 Id. at 36 (quoting Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, n. 1 
(9th Cir. 2009)). 
79 Id. at 28–30. 
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what measures were needed to protect national security.80 If Congress 
amended the CDA, and the president approved the changes, the Court 
might show this deference again. Like the statute in question in HLP, the 
proposed provision is also very limited and applies to only designated 
foreign terrorist organizations.81 Additionally, the measures here would 
not impose criminal liability, and would merely remove a shield 
precluding civil liability. 
Moreover, this proposal is very narrowly tailored. Speech that 
promoted similar end goals (i.e. the political goals of FTOs), but simply 
was authored by those not affiliated with the FTO, would retain complete 
liability protection under the CDA. Consequently, these proposals would 
merely incentivize platforms to take proactive measures to remove some 
of the worst content on their websites but would not chill other speech. 
Additionally, in recognition of the sheer volume of user-generated content 
posted on their sites, this proposal offers companies complete liability 
protection if they make reasonable efforts. Platforms would also only lose 
complete liability protection for content authored by self-proclaimed 
members of FTOs; any private plaintiffs intending to sue the platforms 
would still have to prove the platform had a duty to remove the content 
and the platform’s failure to remove the content caused injury.  
Removing the nearly unlimited protections the CDA provides 
Internet platforms would not lead to the destruction of the Internet as we 
know it. It has been noted that “[i]n the technology world, § 230 of the 
CDA is a kind of sacred cow–an untouchable protection of near-
constitutional status.”82 However, there is a growing realization that the 
current regime is not adequately policing the most problematic online 
content, and Congress has recently acted to make minor changes to the 
CDA.83 This initial Congressional action could facilitate further changes 
to the CDA.84 Additionally, the changes proposed here are modest and 
clearly defined. Companies would receive safe harbor protections when 
they make reasonable efforts to comply. Moreover, the amount required 
to be done to receive the safe harbor protection could vary by the size of 
the platform; so, small platforms could have significantly lower burdens. 
                                                 
80 Id. at 33–34 (noting that “[t]hat evaluation of the facts by the Executive, like 
Congress’s assessment, is entitled to deference. This litigation implicates 
sensitive and weighty interests of national security and foreign affairs.”). 
81 See id. at 35.  
82 Citron & Wittes, supra note 73, at 409. 
83 See Alina Selyukh, Section 230: A Key Legal Shield For Facebook, Google Is 
About To Change, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 21, 2018, 5:11 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/03/21/591622450/section-
230-a-key-legal-shield-for-facebook-google-is-about-to-change. 
84 See id. 
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Consequently, there’s no reason to think the sky would fall if the CDA is 
modified a small amount as this Article proposes.  
These proposals also avoid the imposition of new criminal 
penalties on companies that fail to adhere to the current minimal legal 
requirements to take down third party content.85 Additional criminal 
penalties are likely to result in a significant backlash from technology 
companies, harming the feasibility of the plan. These proposals simply 
allow more moderate civil penalties in addition to the existing criminal 
penalties under the Terrorist Material Support statutes. Consequently, they 
would provide an intermediate civil enforcement mechanism when 
criminal penalties are inappropriate or not purused.  
Identifying the official FTO accounts and the accounts of those 
who specifically self-identify as FTO members would be relatively 
straightforward. FTOs are a distinct, easily enforceable category since they 
are identified by the State Department.86 While there are some fake or 
copycat accounts, many FTO accounts are readily identifiable.87 Platforms 
are also adept as mining their own data88 and there are already companies 
that specialize in filtering user-generated content89 that could likely 
develop methods to filter for FTO accounts. Moreover, companies would 
receive safe harbor protections when they made reasonable efforts to 
comply, protecting them from liability stemming from difficult to identify 
accounts. 
While they do not restrict as much content as some would like, 
these proposals are probably close to the outer limits of what would be 
allowed under current First Amendment jurisprudence. Despite the modest 
                                                 
85 See Susan Klein & Crystal Flinn, Social Media Compliance Programs and the 
War Against Terrorism, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 53, 56–57 (2017) (proposing a 
law requiring social media companies “institute compliance programs that 
discover and report terrorist activity at the earliest possible opportunity,” and 
companies that failed to comply would be subject to criminal penalties but 
receive leniency at sentencing); Ronbert H. Schwartz, Comment, Laying the 
Foundation for Social Media Prosecutions Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, 48. LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 1181, 1212 (2017) (proposing an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, 
which deals with terrorist material support, to “include the provision of a social 
media platform.” The statute includes both civil and criminal penalties).  
86 See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2017). 
87 See Zoe Bedell and Benjamin Wittes, Tweeting Terrorists, Part I: Don’t Look 
Now But a Lot of Terrorist Groups are Using the Twitter, LAWFARE (Feb. 14, 
2016, 5:05 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/tweeting-terrorists-part-i-dont-
look-now-lot-terrorist-groups-are-using-twitter. 
88 See Duhigg, supra note 69. 
89 See SIGHT ENGINE, https://sightengine.com/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
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nature of the proposed changes, they would have a real impact. Companies 
have been at pains to point out how much they rely on the CDA’s liability 
protections.90 Unlike some proposals that encourage companies to bury 
their heads in the sand,91 by threatening to remove the complete liability 
protections they enjoy under the CDA these proposed amendments would 
incentivize platforms to take an active role in combating some of the most 
problematic online speech. Importantly, these changes would likely 
encourage more platforms to institute internal mechanisms to search for 
truly problematic content. Consequently, platforms may err on the side of 
caution and restrict more problematic content than these proposals would 
in actuality require. By keeping the government’s role in policing online 
content minimal, these proposals would also avoid significant concerns 
about government censorship.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For all of its positives, there is a dark side to the Internet. Not 
enough is being done to limit truly harmful online speech. But, it is no 
surprise that little is being done. The First Amendment and the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence make it very difficult to prosecute incitement. 
Moreover, the CDA offers Internet platforms complete liability protection 
for user-generated content. Platforms have a natural tendency to focus on 
profits instead of potentially banning some of their users. These three 
factors all push in the same direction and have created an Internet with too 
much harmful speech. 
 The most effective way to address this problem is to incentivize 
platforms to be part of the solution. The proposals here utilize both a carrot 
and a stick: they offer continued blanket liability protection only on the 
condition that platforms seriously commit to policing the worst of the 
worst user-generated content on their sites. The additional actions 
companies would have to take under these proposals would be modest but 
would go a long way towards addressing some of the very serious 
downsides of the current regime.  
                                                 
90 See Susan Molinari, Google’s Fight Against Human Trafficking, GOOGLE: 
THE KEYWORD (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.blog.google/topics/public-
policy/googles-fight-against-human-trafficking/; Nitasha Tiku, The Sex 
Trafficking Fight Could Take Down a Bedrock Tech Law, WIRED (Sept. 20, 
2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/tech-firms-open-to-changing-
law-to-combat-sex-trafficking/. 
91 See S. 2372, 114th Cong. (2015) (proposing a bill that requires companies 
with “actual knowledge of any terrorist activity” notify the government “as soon 
as reasonably possible,” but providing no incentive for companies to actually 
look for the content). 
